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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Oil" S'l \ i l HI HI Ml : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. 
RODOLFO SOTOLONGO : Case No. 20020528-CA 
\ppeilant : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for aggravated assaul 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated section "'*-; ! 0?(3j (1999). 1 lu^ 
Coin i dins iiiiisiiiiii/tiiiiii i \vi ihe appeal under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(Supp. 2002), which grants this Court * legree 
or capital felony. 
>? I A 1 KMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
In sentencing co-defendants to a crime, sentencing judges inusl . nitwit i \\w 
sentence given the other co-defendants and must provide reasons for sentencing one co-
lefniHlaiil li> a luwici sentence than the others. Here, the sentencing judge gave no 
explanation for senten . . term than m - , , defendant even 
though the co-defendant was convicted of a more scno; 
least culpable of the two. Did the sentencing judge abuse his discretion in imposing a 
more severe sentence? 
This Court reviews sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Montova. 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Appellant argued at sentencing that 
it would be fundamentally unfair to impose a longer sentence than the sentence his more 
culpable co-defendant received. R. 69: 3-4, 9.1 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-201(2) (Supp. 2002) provides sentencing 
judges several options in imposing sentences: 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may 
sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the 
following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
Utah Code Annotated section 77-18-l(2)(a) (1999) grants sentencing judges 
discretion whether to impose probation: 
Volume 69 contains the sentencing hearing transcript. Volume 71 contains the 
presentence investigation report including the various diagnostic evaluations APP 
peifonned at the prison. The internal page numbers of those volumes will be relened to 
"R." followed by the volume number, the internal page numbers of those volumes, and, 
where applicable, the description of the referenced report. 
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OB. a plea of guilty, guilty and mentalh • L contest, or 
conviction of any crime or offense, the cou\ ma> suspend the 
imposition 01 execution of sentence and place the defendant on 
probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private 
organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under tl t. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
()n lime I II, ,'IHM (lit1 Mule tiled an Information charging Appellant Rodolfo 
Sotolongo with attempted i in in I i JHJ u^ LMiivaU'd .r.siiull K ," } I hr State 
subsequently amended the Information and charged Mr. Sotolongo in the .*ih= 
attempted murder or aggravated assault and then added the charge of aggravated 
buj-gjajx magistrate bound the case over for trial following a preliminary 
hearing 
On December 18, 2001, Mr. Sotolongo entered a plea agreement in whit li lie 
agreed to plead guilty to third degree aggravated nsstm! \* : !n exchange, the State 
.(gu'i;<l (in il^ .nii1-1 ''lie more serious charges. < Hi Maiu \ 2002. the trial court accepted 
U r :**lt\ Dlca V 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole ("APP") to psychologically evaluar n. 
R. 50. 
nducted a sentencing hearing oii June 24. 2002 R 69 Defense 
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counsel argued it would not be fair to sentence Mr. Sotolongo to a prison term because 
his co-defendant had pleaded guilty to a second degree felony, was clearly the more 
culpable of the two, and had received a jail sentence and probation. R. 69: 3-4, 9. The 
sentencing judge rejected counsel's arguments and sentenced Mr. Sotolongo for up to 
five years in prison. R. 69: 9-10. Mr. Sotolongo filed a timely notice of appeal on July 
11,2002. R. 57. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 6, 2001, Mr. Sotolongo and Osmani Fuentes went to Rosa Gamarro's 
home to retrieve some of Mr. Fuentes' personal belongings. R. 71: 2. Mr. Fuentes had 
lived with Ms. Gamarro and they had a two-year-old child together. R. 71: 2. After their 
relationship ended the previous month, Ms. Gamarro barred Mr. Fuentes from entering 
the house. R. 71: 4. 
Ms. Gamarro's 18-year-old daughter from a previous relationship, Andrea 
Gamarro, was home when the two men arrived. R. 71: 2. Andrea gave conflicting 
reports about whether she let the men enter or whether they forced themselves into the 
home. R. 71: 2. Mr. Fuentes was enraged over the end of his relationship with Ms. 
Gamarro. R. 71: 2. He was also angry with Andrea because she had called the police a 
few weeks previously about Mr. Fuentes. R. 71: 2. Mr. Fuentes also resented that 
Andrea had renewed her relationship with her birth father and had invited him to her 
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high school graduation. R. 71: 2-4. 
Andrea alleged that Mr. Sotolongo and Mr. Fuentes were both wearing surgical 
gloves when they entered. R /I,,,11 Mr Fuentes began rummaging through the house 
searchingAnv hi< [KT<oii;:ii Ivlongiiigs wliil1 Mi '"-otolongo assisted him. H i\ 2. 
Andrea again gave conflicting reports on whether the men left tin 11»1111r . 11111 r I m 11 1 i 
stayed there. R 7 1 ? Tu anv event, she stated that Mr. Fuentes grabbed her, pushed her 
( ued, and threatened . •-"• o -n . -» A .. .i_
 :} f0Ug}1^ bac]< a n (i struck Mr. 
Fuentr ^ -
Mr. Fuentes asked Mr. Sotolongo for a belt which (^  11 'M 11n11111 11 n1111 i n 1 11 1 
handed to Mr. Fuentes, R, 71 2 Mr. Fuentes then ordered Mr. Sotolongo to hold 
Andrea's legs. I! I ,.! As Mi Sotolongo held down Andrea, Mi Fuentes wrapped the 
belt -.»at vou get for 
calling the police on me.1' k. ,i.^. ivn. Fuentes then sti'im^lnl Aiwliui until Jn. losi 
consciousness. R 71- 2 
When Andrea regained consciousness, she was on the floor and she heard Mr. 
Fuentes *• tenius ioucd .Andrea onto the 
bed and resumed choking her with the belt until she lost c oi lscioi isness agaii i R 71: 2. 
She again awoke and heard Mr. Sotolongo warning Mr. Fuentes that he had better stop. 
\( soon1 poml Ninlii i h\'U'liri1 Un Ilk tdepliuiu .md Mi Fuentes grabbed it away 
5 
from her. R. 71: 3. Andrea and Mr. Fuentes continued to exchange bites, kicks, and 
punches. R. 71: 3. Mr. Fuentes ordered Andrea not to call anyone and threatened to 
harm her and her boyfriend if she did. R. 71: 3. Andrea's mother, Ms. Gamarro, then 
called on the telephone. R. 71: 3. Andrea apparently picked up the phone as both men 
warned Andrea not to say anything to her mother. R. 71: 3.2 
Mr. Fuentes went into the kitchen, grabbed a knife, acted as if he were going to 
stab Andrea, and threatened to kill her if she called the police. R. 71: 3. He warned her 
further that he could have a friend or family member kill her, her mother, and her father 
even if the police arrested him. R. 71: 3. As the men left, Mr. Sotolongo also warned 
Andrea not to call the police on him because he had only held her legs and he would kill 
her if she told anyone. R. 71: 3. 
Andrea called her mother back who in turn notified the police. R. 71: 3. Medical 
personnel transported Andrea to the hospital where she was treated for injuries to her 
face, chest, neck, and abdomen. R. 21. The most serious injury involved swelling that 
commonly occurs in strangulation victims. R. 22-23; R. 71: 15. The treating physician 
noted that Andrea was "exceedingly lucky that she was not killed in this episode." R. 22. 
Nevertheless, the hospital discharged Andrea the same day. R. 23. 
2The presentence report states that Mr. Sotolongo also threatened to kill her if she 
told her mother. R. 71: 3. However, the next sentence states that "He [referring to the 
person who made the threat] then left and defendant [Mr. Sotolongo] stayed." R. 71: 3. 
The account is, therefore, vague on who made this threat. At any rate, it is undisputed 
that Andrea claims that Mr. Sotolongo later threatened to kill her before he left. R. 71: 3. 
6 
The police arrested Mr. Sotolongo at his workplace shortly after the incident. R. 
71:3. Mr. Sotolongo waived his right to counsel and the right to silence and informed 
the police that Mr. Fuentes approached him earlier in the day about retrieving his 
personal belongings for him from the Gamarro residence because Mr. Fuentes had been 
barred from entering the house. R. 71: 3. When the two men arrived at the house, 
Andrea was talking on the telephone with Ms. Gamarro. R. 71: 3. The men began 
retrieving various items and then Mr. Fuentes hung up the phone. R. 71: 3. 
While the two men were in separate rooms, Mr. Sotolongo heard Andrea scream. 
R. 71: 3. Mr. Sotolongo went into the other room and saw Mr. Fuentes on top of 
Andrea. R. 71: 3. Mr. Fuentes ordered Mr. Sotolongo to either grab a belt and to hold 
Andrea's legs or he would kill him. R. 71: 3. After Mr. Sotolongo complied, Mr. 
Feuntes strangled Andrea's neck with the belt and tried to suffocate her with a pillow. R. 
71:3. When Andrea lost consciousness, Mr. Fuentes pushed her off the bed and 
informed Mr. Sotolongo that he wanted to kill Andrea because she had called the police 
on him. R. 71: 3-4. Apparently after Andrea awoke, Mr. Fuentes threatened to kill her if 
she told the police. R. 71: 4. Mr. Sotolongo claimed that he was afraid of Mr. Fuentes 
and feared retaliation against him or his family if Mr. Fuentes knew he was talking to the 
police. R. 71:4. 
The State charged Mr. Sotolongo with attempted murder and aggravated assault. 
R. 2-3. The State later amended the charging document to accuse Mr. Sotolongo of 
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committing either attempted murder or aggravated assault plus aggravated burglary. R. 
25-26. At a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound over Mr. Sotolongo for trial. R. 
28-29. 
Prior to trial, Mr. Sotolongo agreed to plead guilty to third degree aggravated 
assault in exchange for the dismissal of the outstanding charges. R. 37. The trial court 
accepted the guilty plea and ordered APP to prepare a presentence report. R. 43. The 
trial court further committed Mr. Sotolongo to the Utah State Prison for 60 days to allow 
APP to conduct a diagnostic evaluation of him. R. 50. 
The presentence investigation revealed that Mr. Sotolongo was born and raised in 
Cuba by both of his parents. R. 71: 10. He described his childhood as normal and stated 
that he lived in a good, middle-income home. R. 71: 10-11. At the age of 17, he 
emigrated to the United States and settled in Utah. R. 71: 10-11. 
When the attack on Andrea occurred, Mr. Sotolongo was 21 years old. R. 71: 1. 
He was married to Zoila Velasquez. R. 71: 11. Zoila had a three-year-old child from 
another relationship while Zoila and Mr. Sotolongo had a two-year old-child together. R. 
71: 11. 
Mr. Sotolongo stated that he was introverted and had few friends outside his 
family. R. 71: 11. He reported no problems with substance abuse and he had no history 
of mental or emotional problems. R. 71: 13. Because of Mr. Sotolongo's limited 
English skills, the APP investigator indicated that Mr. Sotolongo may have had trouble 
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understanding some questions. R. 71: 13. 
Mr. Sotolongo described himself as a hard-working, good man. R. 71: 12-13. 
Since coming to the United States, he maintained steady employment at various jobs 
including the food service industry and auto repair. R. 71: 12. 
Mr. Sotolongo had previously incurred several traffic violations that resulted in 
fines and one suspended sentence. R. 71: 9. Also, between his arrest in this case and the 
completion of the presentence report, Mr. Sotolongo had been arrested twice for 
domestic violence involving his wife. R. 71: 9-10. APP administered a Level of Service 
Inventory ("LSI") to gauge Mr. Sotolongo's likelihood of re-offending which resulted in 
a low score requiring "a low level of intervention." R. 71: 14. 
When asked to give his version of the offense, Mr. Sotolongo stated that his 
cousin, Mr. Fuentes, picked him up from work and asked for help to retrieve his personal 
belongings at the Gamarros'. R. 71: 4. Upon arrival, Mr. Fuentes informed Mr. 
Sotolongo for the first time that he was not allowed to enter the house. R. 71: 4. Mr. 
Sotolongo offered to retrieve the belongings while Mr. Fuentes waited in the car. R. 71: 
4. 
After returning some videos to the car, Mr. Sotolongo noticed that Mr. Fuentes 
was not in the car. R. 71: 4. He returned to the house and saw Mr. Fuentes sitting on the 
couch. R. 71: 4. Andrea asked Mr. Fuentes to leave and Mr. Sotolongo echoed her 
request and suggested that they leave the house. R. 71: 5. 
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When Mr. Sotolongo went into a bedroom to fetch some clothes, he heard Andrea 
screaming in the other bedroom. R. 71: 5. As he entered the bedroom, he saw Mr. 
Fuentes on top of Andrea choking her. R. 71: 5. Mr. Sotolongo claimed that he then 
grabbed Andrea's feet and pulled her off of the bed in an effort to help her. R. 71: 4-5. 
Mr. Fuentes pushed Mr. Sotolongo against the wall and stated that he wanted to kill 
Andrea. R. 71: 5. Mr. Sotolongo then pushed Mr. Fuentes against the wall and herded 
him out the door. R. 71: 5. 
Mr. Sotolongo returned to the bedroom and asked Andrea three times if she was 
okay. R. 71: 5. Andrea stated that she was alright and asked Mr. Sotolongo to remove 
Mr. Fuentes which he did. R. 71: 5. Mr. Sotolongo denied threatening Andrea and 
being afraid of Mr. Fuentes. R. 71: 5. He stated that he "had nothing!!! to do" with the 
attack. R. 71: 4 (emphasis in original). 
Andrea reported to the APP investigator that the attack had caused her great fear 
and anxiety to the point where she cannot be alone. R. 71: 5-6. She was left with a scar 
on her face which had caused her to lose all self-worth. R. 71: 6. The attack resulted in 
depression for which she was taking medication. R. 71: 6. Although Andrea had 
attended therapy, she stated that it had not helped. R. 71: 6. Because of her fears of 
another attack, she was unable to work. R. 71: 6. Her inter-personal relationships had 
also suffered, as had her family ties. R. 71: 6. Because of the attack, she and her mother 
were forced to move into a friend's garage that had no heating or cooling. R. 71: 6. 
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The APP investigator concluded that Mr. Sotolongo was "open and honest. . . 
about himself." R. 71: 13. The investigator noted, however, that Mr. Sotolongo's claims 
that he tried to save Andrea were inconsistent with his statements to the police that Mr. 
Fuentes forced him to help in the attack and that he feared Mr. Fuentes. R. 71: 15. 
Given these inconsistencies and Mr. Sotolongo's failure to notify the police, the 
investigator concluded that Mr. Sotolongo was not an innocent bystander and had failed 
to accept responsibility for his actions. R. 71: 15. The investigator did note that the fact 
that Mr. Sotolongo was the "lesser participant" in this matter mitigated the severity of the 
crime. R. 71: 15. Noting his concern for Mr. Sotolongo's two subsequent arrests for 
domestic violence and the extent of Andrea's injuries, the investigator recommended 
sentencing Mr. Sotolongo to prison. R. 71: 15-16. 
During the diagnostic evaluation, Mr. Sotolongo disclosed that his family was not 
as functional as he indicated to the APP investigator. Specifically, his father abused his 
mother and his father was imprisoned for 15 years in Cuba for theft. R. 71: 
Psychological Evaluation: 1. At the age of six, Mr. Sotolongo was removed from his 
parents' home for some undisclosed reason and he lived with an uncle who eventually 
emigrated to the United States. R. 71: Psychological Evaluation: 1. 
Mr. Sotolongo dropped out of school in the ninth grade. R. 71: Psychological 
Evaluation at 4. He scored 72 on an IQ test. R. 71: Psychological Evaluation: 4. The 
administrator of this examination doubted the accuracy of the score given Mr. 
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Sotolongo's limited English skills. R. 71: Psychological Evaluation: 4. 
Mr. Sotolongo gave conflicting reports about whether he had threatened Andrea 
and whether Mr. Fuentes threatened to harm him if he did not assist in the attack. R. 71: 
Psychological Evaluation: 3; Diagnostic Evaluation: 2-3; Diagnostic Group Report: 2. 
Several of the evaluators concluded that Mr. Sotolongo had not accepted responsibly for 
his actions and suffered from thinking errors. R. 71: Diagnostic Evaluation: 3; 
Diagnostic Group Report: 2. They reasoned that he minimized the extent of Andrea's 
injuries, he needed power and control, and he regarded himself as the victim of Mr. 
Fuentes' actions. R. 71: Diagnostic Evaluation: 3; Diagnostic Group Report: 1-2. He 
also blamed his wife for overreacting and calling the police on the two domestic violence 
incidents subsequent to his arrest R. 71: Diagnostic Group Report: 2. For these reasons, 
and the fact that two outside treatment facilities had rejected Mr. Sotolongo, the 
evaluators recommended that Mr. Sotolongo be sent to prison and that he receive 
intensive treatment for domestic violence and anger management. R. 71: Psychological 
Evaluation: 6; Diagnostic Evaluation: 4-5; Diagnostic Group Report: 3. 
At sentencing, defense counsel argued that the diagnostic evaluators had 
misjudged Mr. Sotolongo based on his limited ability to understand questions in English. 
R. 69: 2-4. Rather than viewing Mr. Sotolongo's statements as denying responsibility, 
defense counsel asked the sentencing judge to find "a middle ground." R. 69: 2. For 
example, regardless of the true facts, it was undisputed that Mr. Sotolongo was the least 
12 
culpable offender and he undeniably stopped Mr. Fuentes from killing Andrea. R. 69: 2-
3. He also noted that APP considered Mr. Sotolongo a low risk. R. 69: 5. 
Defense counsel argued further that sending Mr. Sotolongo to prison would be a 
"miscarriage of justice" and "fundamentally unfair" given Mr. Fuentes' sentence. R. 69: 
3-4, 9. Mr. Fuentes pleaded guilty to a second degree aggravated assault as opposed to 
Mr. Sotolongo's plea to a third degree felony R. 69: 3. Nevertheless, the sentencing 
judge in Mr. Fuentes9 case suspended a one-to-fifteen year sentence, ordered him to 
serve 365 days in jail with credit for time served, and ordered him to devote 100 hours of 
community service. R. 69: 3. 
The prosecutor requested a prison term instead of probation. R. 69: 9. He 
asserted that regardless of Mr. Fuentes' sentence, Mr. Sotolongo should go to prison. R. 
69: 6-9. Mr. Sotolongo requested a second chance from the sentencing judge and asked 
for probation to allow him to provide for his wife and their two children. R. 69: 5, 9. 
The sentencing judge summarily concluded that Mr. Fuentes' sentence was 
irrelevant and that a prison term of up to five years was proper: "I don't know why the 
co-defendant received the sentence that he did but Mr. Sotolongo, it seems to me that a 
fair sentence for what you did would be the indeterminate term of zero to five years in 
the state prison." R. 69: 9. The judge then ordered Mr. Sotolongo to pay full restitution 
to Andrea and ended the hearing. R. 69: 10. This appeal followed. R. 57. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Although sentencing judges have wide discretion in sentencing, that discretion is 
not unlimited. Sentences cannot be excessive or inherently unfair. Also, when one co-
defendant receives a lengthier sentence than another co-defendant to the same crime, 
sentencing judges must explain on the record the reasons for the disparate sentences. In 
this case, Mr. Sotolongo's prison sentence was grossly unfair given that Mr. Fuentes 
received a jail sentence and probation even though he pleaded to a more serious crime 
and was the most culpable of the two. The sentencing judge's failure to consider Mr. 
Fuentes' sentence in punishing Mr. Sotolongo requires a remand for a new sentencing 
hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
THE SENTENCING JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION 
IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CO-DEFENDANT'S 
SUSPENDED SENTENCE AND THEN SENDING 
APPELLANT TO PRISON EVEN THOUGH HE WAS 
UNDENIABLY THE LEAST CULPABLE OFFENDER 
Before sentencing a co-defendant, sentencing judges must consider the co-
defendants' culpability and the sentences the other co-defendants receive. The 
sentencing judge's failure to compare Mr. Fuentes' sentence and culpability with Mr. 
Sotolongo's culpability was an abuse of discretion. Mr. Sotolongo's prison sentence was 
inherently unfair given Mr. Fuentes' suspended sentence and the undisputed fact that Mr. 
14 
Sotolongo was less culpable. As such, this Court should remand this matter to the trial 
court for a new sentencing hearing. 
The imposition of a prison term under these circumstances was an abuse of 
discretion. Admittedly, sentencing judges have wide discretion in deciding whether to 
order probation in lieu of a prison term. State v. Chapoose. 985 P.2d 915, 917 (Utah 
1999). Judges may "impose sentence or a combination of sentences which may include 
the payment of a fine, restitution, probation, or imprisonment." State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 
417, 420 (Utah 1987); see also; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (Supp. 2002). But, an 
appellate court must set aside a sentence "when it is inherently unfair or clearly 
excessive." State v. Woodland. 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997). 
Sentencing Mr. Sotolongo to prison, given his lesser involvement in the crime and 
in light of Mr. Fuentes' sentence, was "inherently unfair." IdL Although Mr. Sotolongo 
gave Mr. Fuentes the belt used to choke Andrea, held down her legs, and threatened to 
harm her, he also persuaded Mr. Fuentes to suspend the attack and not to kill Andrea. 
Andrea conceded that Mr. Sotolongo told Mr. Fuentes he had better stop or, presumably, 
he would kill Andrea. Thus, Mr. Sotolongo likely saved Andrea's life. 
In comparison, Mr. Fuentes repeatedly hit Andrea in the head, face, chest, and 
abdomen. He then strangled her until she passed out. When she regained consciousness, 
he strangled her again and smothered her face in an apparent attempt to kill her. He 
appeared to be determined to follow through with these attempts until Mr. Sotolongo 
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served as a voice of reason and warned him to stop. Mr. Fuentes' brutal actions far 
outweigh Mr. Sotolongo's assistance and intervention in stopping the attack. 
Fairness demands that judges "consider the sentence given the codefendant and, if 
a longer sentence is given, the reasons for doing so should be set forth on the record." 
State v. Bailev. 834 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Kan. 1992). Disparity among co-defendants' 
sentences requires judges to ffconsider[] the individual characteristics of the defendant 
being sentenced, the harm caused by that defendant, and the prior criminal conduct of that 
defendant." State v. Smith, 864 P.2d 709, 717 (Kan. 1993) (quoting State v. Stallings. 
792 P.2d 1013, 1014 (Kan. 1990)). The failure to consider these factors is an abuse of 
discretion. IdL; see also United States v. Simpson. 8 F.3d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1993) ("if a 
judge sentences similar offenders to greatly disparate terms for the same crime, without 
any explanation, an inference arises that he failed to exercise his discretion.") (quoting 
United States v. Ely. 719 F.2d 902, 906-07 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis omitted)). 
Here, the sentencing judge simply ruled that regardless of Mr. Fuentes' sentence, a 
prison term seemed "fair" to him. R. 69: 9. The judge did not consider Mr. Fuentes' 
sentence, Mr. Sotolongo's comparative culpability, the fact that Mr. Sotolongo's prior 
convictions consisted of minor traffic offenses, or his low risk level for re-offending. The 
sentencing judge abused his discretion in failing to explain his reasons on the record for 
imposing a harsher sentence on Mr. Sotolongo. Bailey, 834 P.2d at 1356. 
Although the diagnostic evaluators recommended a prison term, they did not 
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compare Mr. Sotolongo's sentence with Mr. Fuentes'. In contrast, sentencing judges 
must consider "all legally relevant factors" in sentencing. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 
1133, 1135 (Utah 1989). The sentencing judge's failure to weigh Mr. Fuentes' sentence 
and the two co-defendants' respective culpability require a new sentencing hearing. 
The case of State v. Goering, 594 P.2d 194 (Kan. 1979), provides a strikingly 
similar example of a sentencing judge's failure to compare the defendant's culpability 
with a co-defendant. In that case, the appellant and two co-defendants committed armed 
robbery, kidnaping, and attempted murder. Id at 196-97. It was undisputed that 
appellant was not armed herself and she only served as the get-away driver while the 
other two co-defendants actually committed the crimes. Id. at 201. Without providing 
any reasoning, the sentencing judge imposed consecutive sentences on the appellant while 
her co-defendant received concurrent sentences. Id at 199-200. The Georing Court 
remanded the case for resentencing because the appellant's sentences were "out of 
proportion to the sentence imposed upon her codefendant." Id at 200; see also Bailey, 
834 P.2d at 1356 (sentencing judge abused discretion in giving appellant 45-year 
minimum sentence when more culpable co-defendant received only 30-year minimum 
sentence). 
This case presents an equally compelling case. Mr. Fuentes brutally beat and 
attempted several times to murder a young woman. Absent Mr. Sotolongo's intervention, 
Mr. Fuentes likely would have succeeded. Nevertheless, Mr. Fuentes received probation. 
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In contrast, although Mr. Sotolongo never even struck the victim, he was sent to prison. 
This inherent unfairness constitutes an abuse of discretion. Woodland. 945 P.2d at 671. 
Utah courts do not appear to have specifically addressed whether sentencing 
judges must compare co-defendants' sentences. But, thirty years ago, the Utah Supreme 
Court issued conflicting dicta on this issue. In State v. Kish, 503 P.2d 1208, 1209 (Utah 
1972), the State charged two co-defendants with committing the same crime. The 
prosecutor offered a plea bargain to both co-defendants but only one of them accepted the 
deal. Id When the other co-defendant proceeded to trial, was convicted, and received a 
stiffer sentence than the other co-defendant, he appealed his sentence. Id The Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that the appellant had not been harmed because he could have 
accepted the plea bargain but chose not to. Id 
In dicta, the Court added that even if the prosecutor had only offered the bargain to 
one co-defendant, the other had no claim. Id In support of this assertion, the Court 
quoted the Arizona Court of Appeals' statement that co-defendants cannot '"complain (1) 
if the prosecutor failed to prosecute his brother, or (2) if a jury convicted him and 
acquitted his brother, or (3) if identical sentences were not imposed on both. . . .'" Id. 
(quoting Cuzik v. State. 421 P.2d 537, 538 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966)). 
Less than one month later, the Utah Supreme Court decided State v. Garcia, 504 
P.2d 1015 (Utah 1972). In that case, the prosecutor charged two equally culpable co-
defendants with burglary. Id The prosecutor offered one co-defendant a misdemeanor 
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conviction while not extending the offer to the other. IdL The latter co-defendant 
proceeded to trial and was convicted of a felony. IdL The trial judge, perceiving an 
injustice, arrested the felony judgment and discharged the second co-defendant. IdL The 
Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's decision and ruled that the judge had discretion to 
arrest the judgment. Id. at 1016. 
The dissenting justice quoted the same dicta from Arizona that Kish quoted and 
argued that no injustice had occurred. Id at 1016. Rather, he claimed that prosecutors 
had statutory authority to offer plea bargains to co-defendants in exchange for their 
willingness to testify against the other co-defendant. Id. 
These cases, especially when they were decided within a month of each other, 
appear to conflict. Although Kish cited the proposition that co-defendants cannot 
complain if one of them receives a harsher sentence, Garcia appeared to hold just the 
opposite. These decisions are especially confusing because the dissent in Garcia 
specifically reminded the Court of its earlier ruling less than one month previously. 
These cases do not control this case. In the first place, the quoted language in Kish 
was plainly dicta because the Court had already made its decision and the quotation was 
not necessary to the court's decision. See State v. Gardiner. 814 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 
1991). Second, the Court appeared to backtrack from the quotation a few short weeks 
later when it recognized in Garcia that a co-defendant had been sentenced unfairly. 
Third, Kish and Garcia have no applicability to this case because the co-defendants in 
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those cases were equally culpable, unlike here. Kish, 503 P.2d at 1209; Garcia. 504 P.2d 
at 1015. Fourth, because the Utah Supreme Court has never relied on the quotation from 
Kish since that case was decided 30 years ago, its precedential value appears to be 
limited. Fifth, consistent with this conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically 
limited Garcia's holding to "the proposition that the decision of which crime, if any, to 
charge against a person under a given set of facts is left to the prosecutor." State v. Mohi. 
901 P.2d 991, 1003, n.18 (Utah 1995). In sum, neither, Garcia, nor Kish address the 
fairness of imposing disparate sentences on defendants with varying degrees of 
culpability. 
Common sense and basic notions of fairness dictate that sentencing judges must 
compare co-defendants' sentences. Although a co-defendant's sentence does not bind 
sentencing judges to sentence another co-defendant similarly, fairness and the appearance 
of justice do require judges to state their reasons for imposing disparate sentences. 
Bailey. 834 P.2d at 1356. As stated above, judges must consider "all legally relevant 
factors." Gibbons. 779 P.2d at 1135. Fairness especially requires comparing co-
defendants' sentences and culpability when, as here, one co-defendant is far less culpable 
than the other. Because the sentencing judge failed to factor in Mr. Fuentes' sentence and 




Mr. Sotolongo requests this Court to remand this matter to the trial court for a new 
sentencing hearing with instructions to compare Mr. Fuentes' sentence and culpability in 
sentencing Mr. Sotolongo. 
Submitted, this %± day of September, 2002. 
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ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 








Prosecutor: PARKER, PAUL 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHN WEST 
Interpreter: INTERPRETER PRESENT 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Language: SPANISH 
Date of birth: August 2, 1979 
Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 11:36 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 12/18/2001 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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